••• Tax & Spending •••

Why the approved Chiefs deal is bad economics

Proposed Kansas City Chiefs stadium project financed through Kansas STAR bonds

In December 2025, the deal to bring the Kansas City Chiefs across the state line was agreed upon. Supporters called it a historic win. In reality, it locked Kansas into a multi-decade financial commitment that violates one of the most basic principles of good economics: government should not pick winners and losers.

This deal is now, for all practical purposes, done, but that makes it even more important to be honest about what it means for taxpayers.

The approved agreement commits up to $4 billion to a new domed stadium in Wyandotte County, an adjacent entertainment district, and a team headquarters and training facility in Johnson County. 

Under the terms posted by the Kansas Department of Commerce, the project is structured as a 60–40 public-private partnership, with taxpayers covering about 60% of the cost through diverted tax revenues rather than a direct tax increase. The other 40% is covered by the Kansas City Chiefs.

That distinction may matter politically, but not economically.

How taxpayers are paying

Kansas’s share is financed primarily through STAR bonds, which capture future state sales tax growth inside a specially designated district and redirect it to debt repayment. In this case, repayment also includes 100% of liquor sales taxes generated in the district and money from the Attracting Professional Sports to Kansas Fund, which is fed by sports betting and iLottery revenue.

These latter funds are not new or surplus funds. They are existing and future revenues that would otherwise flow into the state general fund to support schools, roads, public safety, and broad-based tax relief.

As detailed in reporting by the Kansas Reflector, Prairie Village City Council member Ian Graves correctly warned that this deal freezes natural revenue growth for decades within the still unfinalized-boundaries of the district. Sales tax revenues normally rise with inflation. Under this structure, that growth is siphoned off for 20 to 30 years to service stadium debt instead.

Using a financing model that allows changes to assumptions like interest rates and repayment periods, Graves showed that Kansas taxpayers could ultimately be responsible for $3 billion to $4 billion or more over time, including principal and interest. That exposure grows if interest rates stay elevated or if revenue projections fall short.

Lawmakers weakened the guardrails

This deal only works because the Legislature changed the rules.

Normally, STAR bonds cannot cover more than 50% of a project and are repaid over 20 years. To land the Chiefs, lawmakers passed a special law in 2024 allowing STAR bonds to cover up to 70% of a project and stretch repayment to 30 years.

When a project requires lawmakers to weaken fiscal guardrails designed to protect taxpayers, that’s not market success. That’s political engineering.

A private company should bear private risk

The Chiefs are not a fragile startup. They are a multibillion-dollar private enterprise backed by massive league media contracts, sponsorships, and rising franchise valuations. If a new domed stadium in Kansas were truly profitable, the team could have financed it privately through equity, private bonds, or private donations.

That’s how markets are supposed to work.

Instead, Kansas chose to socialize the risk and privatize the reward. Taxpayers are locked into decades of diverted revenue. The team benefits from a publicly supported facility that boosts franchise value regardless of long-term public returns.

This is the same problem documented repeatedly at the Kansas Policy Institute when analyzing stadium subsidies and corporate welfare. These deals consistently overpromise economic impact while underdelivering net benefits. They look exciting upfront and expensive later.

The risks don’t end here

The approved agreement also leaves the door open to additional taxpayer exposure through tools like tax increment financing, community improvement districts, transportation development districts, and potential eligibility for the High Performance Incentive Program, which includes income tax credits and sales tax exemptions.

None of these count toward the advertised 60% taxpayer share. That means the true cost is likely higher than what was approved on paper.

Why picking winners and losers fails

When government favors one powerful company, it penalizes every other business that must compete without special treatment. Local restaurants, manufacturers, retailers, and families all pay full taxes. The Chiefs get carve-outs.

That is not capitalism. That is political allocation of capital.

Markets work best when investment decisions are disciplined by profit and loss, not press conferences. If the stadium succeeds, private investors should have borne the risk. If it fails, taxpayers should not be forced to pretend it didn’t.

Conclusion

The Chiefs deal is now approved, but approval does not make it sound policy.

Kansas chose to spend tomorrow’s revenue today to subsidize a private stadium. That may feel like a win in December 2025, but the bill will arrive quietly over the next three decades.

If Kansas wants sustainable growth, the lesson is simple: stop picking winners and losers and let markets work. A multibillion-dollar private company should pay its own way.