Why the Chiefs deal hurts people today and tomorrow
In a previous post, I explained why the now-approved deal to bring the Kansas City Chiefs to Kansas is bad economics—built on diverted taxes, weakened guardrails, and decades of fiscal risk. What’s become even clearer since then is an often-overlooked truth: even if a subsidy generates more tax revenue, it still makes Kansans worse off.
That may sound counterintuitive to politicians, but it’s basic economics.
Tax revenue is not a benefit to the economy
Much of the defense of the Chiefs deal rests on claims of job creation, economic impact, and higher tax collections. That framing is fundamentally flawed. Tax revenue is a cost to the private economy, not a gain. Every dollar the government captures is a dollar households and businesses no longer control.
Kansas did not “create” new resources by approving this deal. It simply redirected resources—away from families, entrepreneurs, and competing businesses and toward one politically favored, multibillion-dollar private company.
Even if the stadium increases taxable activity in Kansas, that does not mean Kansans are better off. It means the government is taking a larger share of economic activity, often to finance a project that could—and should—have been privately funded.
The direct costs are already locked in
As approved in December 2025, the Chiefs deal commits Kansas taxpayers to covering roughly 60% of a nearly $4 billion project, primarily through STAR bonds, 100% of liquor sales taxes in the district, and money from sports betting and iLottery revenues.
Those funds are not excess or “free.” They are existing and future revenues that would otherwise support core priorities or allow for broad-based tax relief. Instead, they are now committed to stadium debt for 20 to 30 years.
State officials have already pledged roughly $1.8 billion for the stadium and about another $1 billion for the training facility and headquarters, before interest. As Prairie Village council member Ian Graves has shown through his financing model, once interest and long repayment periods are factored in, taxpayers could ultimately be responsible for $3 billion to $4 billion or more.
That is real money that will not be available for anything else.
Opportunity costs are the bigger problem
The most damaging cost is not what Kansas spends—it’s what Kansas cannot do because of this deal.
By design, STAR bonds freeze natural revenue growth. Sales tax revenue normally rises with inflation and population growth. Under this arrangement, that growth is siphoned off across a massive district—potentially nearly all of Wyandotte County and large portions of western Johnson County—to repay stadium debt.
That means less flexibility for:
- tax relief
- public safety
- paying down existing debt
When governments lose revenue, they don’t absorb it painlessly. They either raise taxes elsewhere, cut services, or accumulate more debt. That burden falls on people who never agreed to subsidize a stadium. As a quick aside, this doesn’t mean that governments are entitled to any tax revenue. It simply means that the world is filled with trade-offs: a dollar of sales tax revenue to fund a new stadium is a dollar NOT going to tax relief or to pave roads.
Secrecy compounds the damage
New reporting shows Olathe officials were involved in Chiefs negotiations for nearly two years under nondisclosure agreements, while Wyandotte County leaders—whose residents may bear much of the cost—were looped in only days before the public announcement.
At the same time, Kansas law shields key STAR bond documents from public records disclosure until agreements are finalized. Taxpayers will now be forcedto finance billions without full transparency, while local governments face looming deadlines to pledge their own sales tax revenues.
Markets depend on information. This deal was built on secrecy.
A multibillion-dollar company should pay its own way
The Chiefs are not a public service–even if they’re fun to cheer for. They are a multibillion-dollar private enterprise benefiting from national media contracts, sponsorships, and rising franchise values. If a new domed stadium in Kansas truly made economic sense, private capital would have financed it through equity, private bonds, naming rights, or private donations.
That’s how markets work. Profitable projects attract private investment. Risky projects look for public backstops.
Instead, Kansas chose to socialize the risk and privatize the reward, undermining competition and penalizing businesses and families that pay full freight.
As I’ve written repeatedly at the Kansas Policy Institute on stadium subsidies and corporate welfare, these deals don’t fail because football is bad. They fail because government picking winners and losers always weakens the broader economy.
This should stop
Kansas governments are already spending too much. The answer is not more handouts—especially hidden ones financed through diverted taxes and opaque districts.
We need more personal responsibility, from individuals and employers. Businesses should invest their own capital. Governments should live within their means. Markets should allocate resources through competition, prices, and information, not political leverage.
Final thought
Even if the Chiefs deal raises tax revenue, that is not a win for Kansans. It is a signal that the government is taking more from the private economy to subsidize one powerful interest. A stronger economy and brighter future come from less government favoritism and more market discipline.
